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Incentives in manufacturing: 
the carrot and the stick 
FREDERIC L. PRYOR 
To what degree do different incentives substitute for or 
complement each other in the manufacturing sector? Al-
though this question has received considerable attention on 
the plant level, relatively little information is available on 
the subject for the U.S . manufacturing sector as a whole. 
This study presents the results of a small survey designed 
to elicit information so as to determine the contours of this 
important problem. 
The study focuses on both positive and negative incen-
tives, that is, the carrot and the stick. Positive incentive 
plans tie the compensation of the individual workers directly 
with the work that is done and are of two basic types: 
Individual incentives include piecework or various types of 
bonuses for exceeding norms; Group incentives tie the bonus 
to the performance of the group as a whole, for example, 
profit-sharing plans, stock ownership plans, bonuses based 
on aggregative indicators such as production or productivity . 
Negative incentives are threats or actual use of punishment, 
including financial penalties . These include the hiring of 
additional supervisors to monitor the performance of work-
ers or firing workers for poor performance . Although some 
borderline cases can be cited for which it is difficult to 
determine whether a particular incentive is positive or neg-
ative, in most cases the distinction should be relatively clear. 
For the most part, both positive and negative incentives 
are unilaterally imposed, that is management-controlled (but 
often constrained by union contracts), in contrast to quality 
circles and labor-management committees which are bilat-
eral or cooperative efforts . I do not analyze these latter 
measures because they raise a set of considerations far from 
the major theme of this study . 
Because both positive and negative incentives serve many 
of the same ends, they can be substitutes for each other. 
However, it is also possible that some incentives are com-
plementary to each other. For instance, a high rate of su-
pervision may lead to a high rate of firing (a conjecture not 
supported by the data below) or individual and group in-
centives may accompany each other (a proposition which 
does receive support) . Current economic theory tells us little 
about such relations of complementarity or substitution ; such 
an analysis must, therefore, be carried out primarily on an 
empirical level. 
The sample 
A questionnaire consisting of about 65 questions was sent 
in the summer of 1981 to a stratified random sample of 
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2,050 U.S . manufacturing establishments and addressed to 
the production manager.' The questions focused on hourly 
plant employees and covered not only questions about in-
centives but also the opinions of the managers about the 
effectiveness of particular incentives and about the changes 
in the intensity of work.' Three hundred and sixty usable 
replies were received, and the final sample represents plants 
employing slightly less than 86,000 production workers (about 
0.62 percent of total manufacturing workers) . Although the 
survey is too small to offer conclusive results, a number of 
propositions are generated which warrant more extensive 
testing. 
The characteristics of the plants in the sample parallel 
reasonably closely the characteristics of the total universe 
of U.S . manufacturing plants . The breakdown by two-digit 
industries (Standard Industrial Classification) is roughly similar 
to the United States as a whole.3 The size distribution of 
plants is quite close to that of the total universe of American 
plants with 100 workers or more; however, workers in plants 
with 50 to 99 employees are underrepresented by 40 percent. 
Therefore, the results obtained should be considered only 
as reflecting conditions in larger plants and more impersonal 
working conditions . Geographical distribution of the plants 
in my survey appears quite similar to the country as a whole 4 
and the percentage of unionized workers appears roughly 
the same as the entire manufacturing sector . In sum, al-
though the sample is not perfect, it appears to reflect the 
broad structure of the U.S . manufacturing sector except, as 
intended, for very small plants . 
The data collected differ from the compensation surveys 
of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in two important aspects. 
The BLs data focus on a narrow range of incentives at the 
level of the worker, whereas my data focus on a broad range 
of incentives at the level of plant (for any production workers 
within the plant) . 
Positive incentives 
Plant managers were asked if they had an incentive plan 
system for a large proportion of their hourly plant workers 
and, if so, which of a variety of specified methods they 
used. Summary results concerning the usage of such plans 
are presented in table 1 . 
Problems in presenting the data arise because many plants 
have more than one positive incentive plan ; and in the most 
disaggregated classification (not given), those plants having 
plans with positive incentives averaged 1 .4 different plans 
per plant. In the more aggregated classification presented 
in the table, roughly 30 percent of the plans report more 
than one type of incentive plan, and 16 percent of all plants 
(which cover 22 percent of the workers) have both personal 
and group incentive plans. This multiplicity of various pos-
itive incentive plans within a single plant suggest that at the 
plant level, such incentive systems are complementary . It 
appears likely, however, that within the plant different groups 
of workers may participate in different types of incentive 
Table 1. Reported usage of Incentive plans for production 
workers' 
[In percent] 
Plans Plants 
Productlon 
workers 
All plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 100 
Plants with any incentive plans . . . . . . . . 54 59 
With personal incentive plans . . . . . . . 31 38 
Piecework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 17 
Bonuses for exceeding norms2 . . . . 16 23 
other3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 
With group incentive plans . . . . . . . . . 32 33 
Profit sharing or profit bonuses . . . . 21 12 
Stock purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 
Bonuses based on aggregative indicators 9 14 
(production, sales, shipments) . 
Sharing cost savings, productivity 3 3 
increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
With miscellaneous plans . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 
'The data for each category are presented net of all duplications . Hence, the sums of 
the parts are larger than the reported total, with the differences reflecting the extent to 
which various plants have several types of plans . 
2These include plans based on "standard hour" or "standard day" as well as "in- 
dividual production bonuses." 
3These include bonuses for good attendance and base-pay increases for "good work." 
schemes . For instance, assembly line workers might have 
group bonuses, while those in subsidiary activities might 
have individual bonuses. 
If we examine the percentage of plants with positive in-
centive plans by industry, we find enormous variations in 
both personal and group incentives . In trying to understand 
this variation, I investigated a number of causal variables 
and the results can be briefly summarized . 
Influence of labor unions : There appears to be no sig-
nificant relationship between the presence of a labor union 
and the existence of personal incentive plans; however, 
group incentive plans (especially profit-sharing or stock-
ownership plans for blue-collar workers) are less likely 
to be found in plants with labor unions . For example, 
only 19 percent of plants with a majority of hourly work-
ers which are unionized offered a group incentive plan, 
compared with 44 percent of plants with a majority of 
nonunion hourly workers . 
e Size of plant: No interesting relationships were found 
except that profit-sharing or profit-bonus plans are used 
mostly in smaller plants . 
Technology : I asked the production managers to classify 
the technology of their plant into one of six types : tra-
ditional hand technology, general machining, assembly 
line, continuous flow technology, machine tending, and 
other. Only a few significant relations were found (for 
example, plants using continual process technologies have 
fewer personal incentive plans) . I found no evidence to 
back Norma W. Carlson's contentions that personal in-
centive plans are less likely to be found in machine-paced 
production, although the difference in our results may lie 
in the fact that I tried to classify technology of individual 
plants, while she characterized the type of technology 
using an industrial classification . 
Cost effectiveness of such plans: It is difficult to deter-
mine the cost effectiveness to the manufacturer of using 
such plans . However, it is noteworthy that the rank order 
of industries using piecework or personal incentive plans 
is highly correlated with a similar rank ordering of in-
dustry in France.' This suggests that use of certain tech-
nologies in the production of particular types of goods 
strongly influences the cost effectiveness of personal in-
centive plans . 
Negative incentives 
I asked each manager to designate the number of hourly 
plant employees for each immediate supervisor . The results 
(which can be obtained from the author) show a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the number of 
workers per supervisor and the size of the plant. For in-
stance, 21 percent of the plants with fewer than 100 workers 
had 17 or more production workers per immediate super-
visor, while 33 percent of plants with more than 500 workers 
had this low a degree of supervision . Other factors such as 
the degree of unionization, the type of technology, and so 
forth were not found to be statistically related to the degree 
of supervision . 
Among the questions, I asked the production managers 
to rate the effectiveness of various types of incentives for 
increasing productivity . Of the 11 different measures pro-
vided in the list for that question, "more supervision of 
workers" numbered among the least effective . However, 
they did rank "more training of supervisory personnel" the 
single most effective measure to achieve higher productiv-
ity . This suggests that the managers consider the positive 
help that supervisors can give to their subordinates much 
more effective in raising productivity than the police role 
that the supervisors may play . 
In addition, I asked the production managers to provide 
the percentage of workers "fired in the past year for poor 
job performance." The quantitative results examined by 
industry are quite similar to previously unpublished BLS 
surveys on the phenomenon .7 
The most important causal factor underlying the rate of 
firing appears to be the degree of unionization . For instance, 
in plants with a majority of production workers unionized, 
5 percent or more workers were annually fired in only 25 
percent of the plants ; among plants with a majority of non-
union workers, this percentage was 44 percent . Such results 
parallel the findings of Charles Brown and James L. Medoff, 
and Richard B. Freeman9, who present quite different types 
of evidence showing that unionization is inversely related 
to labor turnover . This phenomenon is more dramatically 
seen when we examine changes in the rate of firing poor 
workers when the unionization status of workers has changed. 
For instance, in my sample, the rate of firing poor workers 
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increased over the last decade in 33 percent of the plants 
which are not unionized now but were unionized a decade 
ago; while this rate increased in only 20 percent of the plants 
which are now unionized but which were not unionized a 
decade ago. These results cannot tell us, however, whether 
the cause of this inverse relationship between labor turnover 
and unionization is due to the greater "voice" which union 
workers receive (an explanation offered by Freeman [ 1980], 
Brown and Medoff [ 1978] and others) or is due to union 
efforts to reduce the rate at which workers are fired. 
Are the two types of negative incentives complements to 
each other (as are the two types of positive incentives) or 
substitutes? At a particular time, such a relationship cannot 
be easily seen ; however, the time series data suggest strongly 
that they are substitutes . For instance, where the ratio of 
supervisors to production workers has increased over the 
last decade, the rate of firing increased in only 24 percent 
of the plants ; where the degree of supervision has decreased 
over the last decade, the rate of firing has increased in 42 
percent of them . This inverse relationship between changes 
in the degree of supervision and changes in the degree of 
firing poor workers means that if plants cannot (either be-
cause of pressure from labor unions or other considerations) 
encourage productivity by firing poor workers, they appear 
to increase the rate of supervision instead. 
Positive and negative incentives compared 
Analyzing the degree to which positive and negative in-
centives are substitutes or complements raises some prob-
lems . Because the two types of negative incentives appear 
to be substitutes for each other, aggregating them and com-
paring the results with the aggregate results of the positive 
incentives does not seem a fruitful way of attacking the 
problem. Instead, a more disaggregative approach is re-
quired . 
The following is a comparison of some positive and neg-
ative incentives by presence of incentive plan and the num-
ber of production workers per immediate supervisor: 
centive pay systems, the lower the degree of supervisor, 
and vice versa. The relationship is revealed not only at a 
single point in time but in other calculations where changes 
in the use of positive incentives and changes in the degree 
of supervision are examined over time . 
Because intensive supervision and the rate of firing appear 
inversely related to each other and because intensive su-
pervision and the presence of positive incentives also appear 
inversely related, we might expect to find a positive rela-
tionship between the rate of firing and the presence of pos-
itive incentives . Although this complementary relationship 
can, indeed, be found for particular types of positive in-
centives (for example, piecerate) and the rate of firing, such 
a positive relationship on an aggregative basis is not ob-
served either at a single point in time or over time . 
THIS SMALL SAMPLE SURVEY of the American manufactur-
ing sector suggests that positive incentives (individual and 
group plans) are complementary to each other, that major 
negative incentives (the rate of supervision and the rate of 
firing) are substitutes for each other, and that the positive 
incentives and the rate of supervision are also substitutes 
for each other. 
While it would be possible to carry out a similar survey 
on a much larger scale, more useful information could be 
gained if both plant and individual data could be obtained . 
That is, data on the types of workers within a given plant 
covered by particular types of incentives would be more 
useful than the plant data which I have collected. This in-
formation would provide a database permitting not only a 
much closer look at the suitability of particular types of 
incentives for particular types of workers but also would 
permit a closer monitoring of some important managerial 
efforts to increase productivity . Combined with data on plant 
performance, we could also begin the important task of 
assessing the effectiveness of particular types of 
incentives . El 
FOOTNOTES 
Presence of 
personal in- 
centive plan 
Yes No 
Presence of 
group incentive 
plan 
Yes No 
Production workers per 
supervisor 
1 through 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 71 37 71 
9 through 16 . . . . . . . . . . 24 97 46 75 
17 and over . . . . . . . . . . . 42 57 20 79 
x2 = 13 .5 x'-= 8.6 
The reported chi square statistics (x2) are uncorrected for 
the size of the sample . Both of the calculated statistics are 
significant at the .95 degree of confidence . 
The above results suggest that there is a statistically sig-
nificant inverse relationship between the use of incentive 
plans (particularly, individual incentive plans) and close 
supervision of workers . That is, the greater the use of in- 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT: The research for this study is part of a larger project 
that was financed by, and carried out at : Swarthmore College, the Centre 
d'Economie quantitative et comparative at the Ecole des hautes Etudes en 
sciences sociales (Paris) and the Institut universitaire des hautes etudes 
intemationale (Geneva). I would like to thank these institutions for their 
aid . In addition, 1 would like to express my appreciation to David Granick, 
Clark Kerr, Marie Lavigne, Jerome A . Mark, Daniel Pryor, Millard H . 
Pryor, Jr., Millard H . Pryor Sr., Zora Pryor, and Richard Rubin for their 
useful comments and help at various stages of this research . 
All comparisons with U.S . manufacturing plants as a whole are made 
with the universe of plants in 1977, the last year for which detailed data 
were available to me . Almost all such comparisons are made with the 
census of manufacturing data for that year . 
' The names of the plants were obtained from a direct mailing company 
whose master list was reported to contain 86 percent of all U.S . plants . 
To reduce the costs of the survey and to increase its coverage of total 
workers, the questionnaires were sent only to plants with more than 50 
reported employees . 
I The latter results are reported in Frederic L. Pryor, "Some Economics 
of Sloth," The Social Science Review, 5, No . I (Fall 1983), pp . 82-102 . 
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3The average coverage of production workers is 0.624 percent ; the 
standard deviation of this ratio among the 20 two-digit manufacturing 
industries is 0.242 . The most underrepresented industry in the sample is 
leather and leather products (sic 31 ), followed by rubber and plastic prod-
ucts (sic 30), and then printing and publishing (sic 27). The most over-
represented industry is electrical machinery (sic 36), followed by stone, 
glass and clay products (sic 32) and then tobacco and tobacco products 
(sic 21) . The last industry, although overrepresented by the number of 
workers, is represented only by one plant. In most of the statistical work 
underlying this study, I combined the most underrepresented industries 
into one group. 
"The Northeast region is somewhat underrepresented and the Deep South 
is somewhat overrepresented. Otherwise, the representation of the nine 
census regions is very close to the national distribution . 
'Norma W. Carlson, "Time rates tighten their grip on manufacturing 
industries," Monthly Labor Review, May 1982, pp . 15-23. 
'Of the five industries in both the United States and France with the 
highest percentage of workers covered under such personal incentive plans, 
four are the same: textile (sic 22), apparel (sic 23), transportation equip-
ment (sic 37), and nonelectrical machinery (sic 35) . Of the five industries 
in each nation with the least usage of such plans, four are the same : 
chemicals (sic 28), rubber and plastic products (sic 30), food and tobacco 
(sic 20 and 21 combined), and wood and furniture (sic 24 and 25 com-
bined) . The French data come from Elisabeth Vlassenko, "L'enquete sur 
la structure des salaires," Economie et statistique, No. 131 (March 1981), 
pp . 23-35 ; and La structure des salaires dons l'industrie et les services 
en 1978 in Les collection de PINSEE, Series M., No . 90-91 (March 1981). 
' A former plant manager raised an interesting objection at this point-
namely, that neither my data nor the Bt.s data on firing are very accurate 
because of ambiguities arising from treatment of the probationary period 
that each new worker serves . Before the end of this period . any worker 
can be "released" with ease ; and it is unclear whether such actions are 
included in either the BLS or my data on fired workers because personnel 
on the probationary period are not, in a very real sense, regular workers. 
"Charles Brown and James L. Medoff, -Trade Unions in the Production 
Process," Journal of Political Economy, 86, No . 3 (June 1978), pp . 355-
78 . 
`'Richard B. Freeman, "The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Markets: 
Unions, Job Tenure, Quits, and Separations." Quarterly Journal gj'Eco-
nomics . 94, No . 4 (June 1980), pp . 643-74 . 
Carnegie-Mellon honors BLS Commissioner 
Commissioner of Labor Statistics Janet L . Norwood received an 
honorary Doctor of Laws degree May 14 from Carnegie-Mellon 
University . The citation read in part : 
Economist and statistician, methodological innovator, manager 
and government leader . . . As Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in this its Centennial year, she is the guardian of 
the nation's two most important statistical series-the unemploy-
ment rate and the consumer price index . . . 
Her own words and actions present to us the model of a 
dedicated civil servant and true professional : a commitment to ob-
jectivity and fairness, an insistence on candor at all times, protec-
tion of confidentiality, the constant pursuit of improvement and a 
willingness to change, and finally the maintenance of the highest 
standards of performance at all times . . . 
